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    ollowing China’s illegal occupation of Mischief Reef in January 1995, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a Joint Communi-
qué in 1996 expressing concern over the situation in the South China Sea 
(SCS) and calling “for the peaceful resolution of the dispute and self-restraint 
by parties concerned.”1 The ASEAN ministers further “endorsed the idea of 
concluding a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea, which will lay 
the foundation for long term stability in the area and foster understanding 
among claimant countries.”2  
Over the next three years, ASEAN member States finalized a draft code 
of conduct, which was provided to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1999 for consideration at the first meeting of the Working Group of the 
ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultations on the Code of Conduct. Af-
ter three years of painstaking negotiations, the two sides concluded an aspi-
rational, non-binding Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea (DOC) on November 4, 2002.  
The DOC was intended to be an important first step towards setting the 
conditions for a peaceful and durable solution to the long-standing territorial 
and maritime disputes in the SCS, and each party undertook to respect and 
take actions consistent with its provisions. In addition, the parties affirmed 
the need to adopt a binding Code of Conduct to further promote peace and 
stability in the SCS and agreed “to work, on the basis of consensus, towards 
the eventual attainment of this objective.”3  
Regional leaders instantly hailed the DOC as a momentous achievement 
between ASEAN and the PRC. This euphoria, however, was short-lived as 
China routinely ignored the DOC’s provisions by resorting to threats and 
use of force against the other SCS claimants and engaging in activities that 
raised tensions and undermined regional peace and stability by occupying, 
reclaiming, and militarizing a number of uninhabited SCS features.4 Two 
 




3. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Nov. 4, 2002, 
https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-
sea-2. 














decades later, thanks to Chinese stonewalling and blatant disregard of the 
DOC’s provisions, the elusive binding Code of Conduct has yet to material-
ize. Preoccupation with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic has also brought 
negotiations to a standstill. Nonetheless, in August 2020, Chinese officials 
called on their ASEAN counterparts to resume Code of Conduct negotia-
tions as soon as possible, which begs the question—is a Code of Conduct 
still relevant given that China has significantly changed the status quo in the 
SCS over the past decade? After careful examination, the answer to that 
question is no.  
 
II. CHINESE TRANSGRESSIONS 
 
There are too many Chinese transgressions in direct violation of its voluntary 
commitment to observe the provisions of the DOC to document in a single 
paper. As ASEAN diplomats struggled to achieve consensus on a binding 
Code of Conduct that would appease Chinese demands, Beijing engaged in 
a series of malign activities that have interfered with the resource rights of 
other claimants in their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and con-
tinental shelves by sinking fishing boats, harassing survey vessels and off-
shore oil rigs, illegally seizing fishing equipment and fish catches, and coerc-
ing foreign oil companies to abandon offshore projects.5 This provocative 
behavior clearly violated China’s commitment in the DOC to resolve the 
SCS disputes by peaceful means and without resorting to the threat or use 
of force. 
Most notably, however, China established a series of military outposts 
on reclaimed artificial islands that have forever changed the landscape and 
status quo of the SCS. China’s militarization of its SCS outposts violated its 
 
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by 
peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consulta-
tions and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally 
recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea;  
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would 
complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, re-
fraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, 
and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner. 
 
Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. 
5. MICHAEL GREEN ET AL., COUNTERING COERCION IN MARITIME ASIA: THE THE-













commitment to exercise self-restraint in conducting activities that could 
complicate or escalate the ongoing disputes and affect regional peace and 
stability. China’s artificial island-building also caused extensive environmen-
tal damage to the fragile ecosystem in-and-around Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, 
Gaven (North), Johnson, Hughes, Subi, and Mischief Reefs,6 and breached 
China’s treaty obligations under the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UN-
CLOS).7 Moreover, China’s construction activities on Mischief Reef, which 
is a low-tide elevation within the Philippine EEZ/continental shelf and 
therefore not capable of appropriation by China, violated the Philippines’ 
sovereign rights and breached China’s obligations under UNCLOS.8 
Although land reclamation by the other SCS claimants has occurred over 
the past forty years, it pales in comparison to China’s activities. Between 
2013 and 2015, the PRC reclaimed over 3,200 acres of land on seven9 of the 
eight features it occupies in the Spratly Islands.10 By comparison, the other 
claimants reclaimed 172 acres in forty years. That means Chinese activities 
account for over 95 percent of all reclaimed land in the Spratlys.11  
Beginning in 2015, the PRC transitioned from land reclamation to infra-
structure development on each of its reclaimed outposts. Shore-based infra-
structure improvements have been completed on its four smallest out-
posts—Johnson, Gaven, Hughes, and Cuarteron Reefs—to include fixed-
land-based naval guns, administrative buildings, sensor emplacements, and 
improved communications facilities.12 More substantial improvements have 
been made to Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs, including new airfields, 
deep channels to improve access, large port facilities with berthing areas for 
larger ships, water and fuel storage facilities, fighter-sized hangars, fixed-
 
6. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, PCA Case Reposi-
tory, Award ¶¶ 818–993, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). 
7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, 123, 
206, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
8. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, ¶¶ 994–1043; UNCLOS, supra note 7, arts. 
60, 80. 
9. These features include Fiery Cross, Subi, Mischief, Johnson, Gaven, Hughes, and 
Cuarteron Reefs. 
10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY 
16 (2015) [hereinafter ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY]. 
11. Id. 
12. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, MILITARY AND 
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 12 (2017) 
[hereinafter DOD ANNUAL REPORT (2017)]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEO-











weapons positions, administration buildings, communication and surveil-
lance facilities, and barracks.13 These improvements will give the PRC the 
“capacity to house up to three regiments of fighters in the Spratly Islands”14 
and increased capabilities to support military operations throughout the SCS 
and beyond.15  
By significantly enhancing and militarizing these features, the PRC has 
established a robust power projection presence in the SCS, unilaterally 
changed the physical status quo in the region, and bolstered its de facto con-
trol of the Spratlys. New airfields with combat-capable aircraft, larger port 
facilities, and improved logistics hubs have allowed the China Coast Guard 
(CCG) and People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) to establish a more flex-
ible and continuous presence in the SCS. This persistent presence improves 
“China’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third 
parties, widens the range of capabilities available to the PRC, and reduces 
the time required to deploy them.”16 This further complicates diplomatic in-
itiatives aimed at reducing tensions and ultimately resolving the underlying 
territorial disputes. 
The United States has made it clear that it views Chinese militarization 
and territorial expansion in the South China Sea as “illegal and dangerous.”17 
These actions threaten “the sovereignty of many nations and endanger the 
prosperity of the world.”18 Accordingly, the United States has “called on 
China to withdraw its missile systems from disputed features in the Spratly 
Islands, and reaffirmed that all countries should avoid addressing disputes 
through coercion or intimidation.”19 
 
 
13. DOD ANNUAL REPORT (2017), supra note 12, at 12; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN-
VOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 13 (2016) [hereinafter DOD ANNUAL RE-
PORT (2016)]. 
14. DOD ANNUAL REPORT (2017), supra note 12, at 12. 
15. DOD ANNUAL REPORT (2018), supra note 12, at 17. 
16. DOD ANNUAL REPORT (2016), supra note 13, at 13; DOD ANNUAL REPORT 
(2017), supra note 12, at 12; DOD ANNUAL REPORT (2018), supra note 12, at 17. 
17. Michael R. Pence, Vice President of the United States, Remarks at the East Asia 
Summit Plenary Session (Nov. 16, 2018), https://asean.usmission.gov/prepared-remarks-
for-vice-president-pence-at-the-east-asia-summit-plenary-session/. 
18. Id. 
19. Media Note, U.S. Department of State, U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dia-












III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Notwithstanding countless setbacks since 2002, Code of Conduct enthusi-
asts routinely say that there is hope on the horizon. Even China, which has 
slow-rolled the Code of Conduct discussions for the past twenty years, now 
appears eager to quickly conclude the negotiations. 
 
A. Agreed Framework20 
 
In May 2017, ASEAN and the PRC adopted a Framework of a Code of 
Conduct in the South China Sea intended to “facilitate the work for the con-
clusion of an effective Code of Conduct on a mutually-agreed timeline.”21 
The Joint Communiqué further recognized that a Code of Conduct would 
contribute to “peace, stability and prosperity” in the SCS.22 The Framework 
was endorsed by the foreign ministers of the PRC and ASEAN on August 
6, 2017.23 The Framework is divided into three broad sections—preambular 
provisions, general provisions, and final clauses. 
 The preambular provisions include three subtopics, which are not 
controversial: (1) bases of the Code of Conduct; (2) an undefined linkage 
between the DOC and the Code of Conduct; and (3) importance of the Code 
of Conduct and aspirations of the participants.  
 The general provisions also have three subtopics: (1) objectives, (2) 
principles, and (3) basic undertakings. The first objective is “to establish a 
rules-based framework containing a set of norms to guide the conduct of 
parties and promote maritime cooperation in the South China Sea.”24 The 
second objective is “to promote mutual trust, cooperation and confidence, 
prevent incidents, manage incidents should they occur, and create a favour-
able environment for the peaceful settlement of disputes.”25 Similar to the 
 
20. For a detailed assessment of the Framework for the Code of Conduct, see Ian Sto-
rey, Assessing the ASEAN-China Framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, ISEAS 
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_62.pdf 
[hereinafter Storey, Assessment]. 
21. Joint Communiqué of the 50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Partnering for 
Change, Engaging the World (Aug. 5, 2017), https://asean.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/08/Joint-Communique-of-the-50th-AMM_FINAL.pdf. 
22. Id. 
23. Storey, Assessment, supra note 20, at 2. 












DOC, the third objective is “to ensure maritime security and safety and free-
dom of navigation and overflight” in the SCS.26 
 In the first principle, the parties make clear that the Code of Conduct 
is “not an instrument to settle territorial disputes or maritime delimitation 
issues,” which will need to be resolved by the claimants via other dispute 
settlement mechanisms.27 In the second principle, the parties commit to the 
“purposes and principles” of the UN Charter, UNCLOS, the Treaty of Am-
ity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC),28 the Five Principles of Peace-
ful Coexistence,29 and “other universally recognized principles of interna-
tional law.”30 In the third principle, the parties commit “to full and effective 
implementation of the DOC” but do not specify how that will be done.31 
The fourth principle is taken from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexist-
ence and provides that the parties will respect “each other’s independence, 




28. Article 1 provides that: “The purpose of this Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, 
everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their 
strength, solidarity and closer relationship.” Article 2 provides that:  
 
in their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the 
following fundamental principles: 
a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and    
national identity of all nations; 
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion; 
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 
f. Effective cooperation among themselves. 
 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, 1025 U.N.T.S. 297, as 
amended by the Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia, Dec. 15, 1987, 27 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 609 (1988), and the Second 
Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, July 25, 1998, 
http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140117142023.pdf [hereinafter TAC]. 
29. The five principles are mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sov-
ereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Trade and Inter-
course between Tibet Region of China and India, China-India pmbl., Apr. 29, 1954, 299 
U.N.T.S. 57. 












and reiterates the “principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other states.”32 
 The basic understandings section contains six topics: (1) duty to co-
operate (as required by UNCLOS); (2) promotion of practical maritime co-
operation (e.g., search and rescue, maritime scientific research, environmen-
tal protection, and combating transnational crime at sea); (3) self-re-
straint/promotion of trust and confidence (albeit undefined); (4) prevention 
of incidents (confidence-building measures and hotlines); (5) management 
of incidents (hotlines); and (6) “other undertakings in accordance with inter-
national law, to fulfill the objectives and principles of the [Code of Con-
duct].”33 
 The Framework concludes with five final clauses: (1) encourage 
other countries to respect the principles contained in the Code of Conduct, 
(2) necessary mechanisms for monitoring of implementation (albeit unde-
fined), (3) review of the Code of Conduct, (4) nature, and (5) entry into force 
(in accordance with each party’s domestic processes). 
 
B. Single Draft Negotiating Text 
 
A year after endorsing the Framework, ASEAN and the PRC announced 
that they had reached an agreement on a Single Draft South China Sea Code 
of Conduct Negotiating Text (SDNT), which would serve as a point of de-
parture for future Code of Conduct negotiations.34 A Malaysian proposal for 
inclusion in section 2 on “general provisions” makes clear that the Code of 
Conduct is not intended to address the long-standing territorial and maritime 
boundary disputes in the SCS: “The Parties . . . acknowledge that the Code 
of Conduct does not address nor affect the Parties’ position on legal ques-
tions relating to the settlement of disputes, maritime boundaries, or the per-
missible maritime entitlements of the Parties under international law of the 
sea and . . . reflected in . . . UNCLOS.”35  
Although considered a monumental achievement by some, the nineteen-




34. For a detailed assessment of the SDNT, see Carl Thayer, A Closer Look at the 














China’s motivation for agreeing to negotiate a Code of Conduct. Of note, an 
international arbitral tribunal ruled that “China’s claims to historic rights, or 
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of 
the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ 
are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect . . . .”36 Accordingly, 
the tribunal concluded that UNCLOS “superseded any historic rights or 
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed 
therein.”37  
Nonetheless, China’s negotiating position on the SDNT relies on the 
nine-dash line as the basis for cooperation. China should not be allowed to 
defy the tribunal’s award by trying to force an agreement premised on a claim 
that an international tribunal has invalidated. As a result, some countries 
have called on ASEAN and the PRC to ensure that the Code of Conduct is 
“consistent with existing international law, as reflected in UNCLOS; . . . 
[does] not prejudice the interests of third Parties or the rights of all states 
under international law; . . . reinforce[s] existing regional architecture; and . . 
. strengthen[s] Parties’ commitments to cease actions that would complicate 
or escalate disputes.”38 
 
1. Geographic Scope 
 
The first glaring omission from the SDNT is the geographic scope of the 
Code of Conduct. During the first round of negotiations, both Malaysia and 
Singapore recommended that the geographic scope of the Code of Conduct 
be defined. Vietnam proposed that the Code “shall apply to all disputed fea-
tures and overlapping maritime areas claimed under . . . UNCLOS” in the 
SCS.39 Indonesia suggested that “the Parties are committed to respect the 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the coastal states as pro-
vided for in . . . UNCLOS.”40 These proposals all have one thing in com-
mon—ASEAN expects that the Code of Conduct’s scope of application will 
include all waters and features encompassed by the PRC’s infamous nine-
 
36. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 7, ¶ 278; see also id. ¶¶ 169–278. 
37. Id. ¶ 278. 
38. Media Note, U.S. Department of State, Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral 
Strategic Dialogue Joint Ministerial Statement (Aug. 5, 2018), https://2017-
2021.state.gov/australia-japan-united-states-trilateral-strategic-dialogue-joint-ministerial-
statement/index.html. 












dash line. Given that the Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal are bilateral 
disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines, respectively, Beijing may seek to 
limit the geographic scope of the Code of Conduct to the Spratly Islands. Of 
note, the DOC is similarly silent on the issue of geographic scope. 
 
2. Dispute Settlement 
 
Although a number of the general provisions in the Framework speak in 
terms of preventing and managing incidents, monitoring full and effective 
implementation of the Code of Conduct, and peaceful settlement of dis-
putes, the SDNT fails to require compulsory third-party dispute settlement 
should bilateral efforts to resolve the issues fail. Moreover, proposals by the 
participants similarly fail to address the issue of compulsory dispute settle-
ment. 
For example, Indonesia and Vietnam suggested that disputes be resolved 
pursuant to Chapter IV of the TAC. Reliance on the TAC dispute settlement 
mechanisms is problematic given that it is a consent-based process. Article 
14 establishes a High Council comprised of members from each of the States 
parties that is responsible for taking cognizance over “disputes or situations 
likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.”41 If the parties cannot settle 
the dispute through direct negotiations, the High Council shall then take 
cognizance of the dispute. However, the High Council can only make “rec-
ommendations” on the appropriate means of settlement, such as “good of-
fices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation.”42 Additionally, the High Council 
may only offer its good offices upon agreement of the parties in dispute. 
Moreover, Article 16 provides that the dispute settlement provisions of the 
TAC “shall not apply to a dispute unless all the Parties to the dispute agree 
to their application to that dispute.”43  
Indonesia offered an alternative proposal that, if a resolution cannot be 
achieved under the TAC, then the matter could be referred to an appropriate 
third-party dispute settlement mechanism, but only with the consent of the 
concerned parties. Nevertheless, any dispute settlement mechanism based 
on consent is doomed to failure. To be effective, the Code of Conduct must 
contain a compulsory, binding dispute settlement mechanism similar to that 
found in UNCLOS, Part XV, but one that can be enforced without the con-
sent of the parties by the International Court of Justice, the International 
 
41. TAC, supra note 28, art. 14. 
42. Id. art. 15. 











Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (for maritime issues), the TAC, or other 
international judicial body created by the Code of Conduct. 
China has demonstrated its proclivity not to abide by its international 
legal obligations under UNCLOS by rejecting the jurisdiction and refusing 
to abide by the unanimous decision of the South China Sea arbitral tribunal. 
As parties to UNCLOS, the award is final and binding on the Philippines 
and China, as set out in Article 296 and Article 11 of Annex VII.44 Nonethe-
less, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the “award is null 
and void and has no binding force” and that “China neither accepts nor rec-
ognizes it.”45 
 
3. Legal Status 
 
To achieve its desired end state and proper implementation, the Code of 
Conduct must be a legally binding international instrument. Granted, even if 
legally binding, China may still not comply. As previously discussed, the ar-
bitral tribunal found that China had willfully violated its treaty obligations 
under the COLREGS46 and UNCLOS by engaging in aggressive, unsafe, and 
unprofessional maneuvers in the proximity of Philippine fishing vessels at 
Scarborough Shoal. It also found China was in breach of its obligations un-
der UNCLOS by conducting large-scale reclamation activities in the Spratlys, 
thereby causing damage to the marine environment. Nevertheless, unless the 
Code of Conduct is a binding treaty on all parties that can be enforced 
through a compulsory dispute resolution mechanism, it will fail. 
Recognizing the importance of a legally binding instrument, Vietnam 
submitted a proposal indicating that the contracting States “have consented 
to be bound by the present Code of Conduct.”47 The Vietnamese proposal 
additionally provides that the Code of Conduct “be subject to ratification in 
accordance with the respective internal procedure of the signatory States” 
and that States deposit their instrument of ratification with the ASEAN Sec-
retary-General.48 Ultimately, the Secretary-General would be responsible for 
 
44. UNCLOS, supra note 7, art 296, annex VII, art. 11.   
45. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Statement of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Mar-
itime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea (July 12, 2016), www.fmprc.gov.cn/nan-
hai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1379492.htm. 
46. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 
20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. No. 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16. 












registering the Code of Conduct with the United Nations. Finally, both Vi-
etnam and Brunei have proposed that, like Article 309 of UNCLOS, no res-
ervations may be made by a contracting State when signing the Code of Con-
duct.49 
 
4. Duty to Cooperate 
 
Some of the more controversial proposals by the PRC regarding the duty to 
cooperate appear in the basic understandings sub-section of the general pro-
visions. Regarding cooperation on the marine economy, which includes aq-
uaculture, marine culture, and oil and gas development, Beijing proposed 
that cooperation may only be carried out by the littoral States “and shall not 
be conducted in cooperation with companies from countries outside the re-
gion.”50 Malaysia countered the Chinese proposal, suggesting that nothing in 
the Code of Conduct “shall affect . . . rights or ability of the Parties to con-
duct activities with foreign countries or private entities of their own choos-
ing.”51 
China has additionally submitted six proposals regarding self-re-
straint/promotion of trust and confidence. If implemented in accordance 
with international law, five of the six points are not controversial: 
 
• “Military activities in the region shall be conducive to enhancing mutual 
trust.”  
• Defense and military forces will conduct exchanges, including “mutual 
port calls of military vessels and joint patrols on a regular basis.”  
• China and ASEAN member States will undertake joint military exercises 
on a “regular basis.” 
• Military ships and aircraft enjoy sovereign immunity and are “immune 
from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag state,” and that 
military ships and aircraft are entitled to self-defense “but should have 
due regard for the other side’s military vessels and military aircraft.”  
• All persons who are in danger or distress at sea in the SCS are entitled to 

















Indonesia and Vietnam made similar proposals. Indonesia suggested: “dia-
logues between defense and military officials, humane treatment of persons 
in distress, voluntary notification of impending joint/combined military ex-
ercises, and the exchange of relevant information on a regular basis.”53 Vi-
etnam proposed that all parties respect “the maritime zones as provided for 
and established in accordance with . . . UNCLOS,” which would in effect 
nullify the PRC’s nine-dash line claim, and that the parties provide sixty days 
notification of “impending joint/combined military exercise/drill” in the 
SCS.54 
The PRC’s sixth point, however, is highly controversial: “The Parties 
shall establish a notification mechanism on military activities, and to notify 
each other of major military activities if deemed necessary. The Parties shall 
not hold joint military exercises with countries from outside the region, un-
less the Parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objec-
tion.” This provision, if accepted, would give the PRC a veto over ASEAN 
member States’ military exercises with the United States and other non-re-
gional military forces, like Australia, India, and Japan.  
Given China’s misbehavior discussed above, Vietnam also proposed that 
contracting States be prohibited from constructing artificial islands, milita-
rizing any features, blockading vessels carrying provisions or personnel for 
rotation, declaring an air defense identification zone, and conducting simu-
lated attacks at the vessels and aircraft of other countries.55 The Philippines 
similarly added a provision to protect its fishermen: “respect of the exercise 
of traditional fishing rights by fishermen . . . [and] access to features and 
fishing grounds.”56 
 
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
During a speech in Singapore on November 13, 2018, Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang stated that he was optimistic that the PRC and ASEAN could con-
clude the Code of Conduct negotiations within three years.57 ASEAN agreed 






57. Ian Storey, Chinese Premier Li Calls for South China Sea Code of Conduct by 2021, ISEAS 












summit in Thailand in 2019.58 The impact of the global coronavirus pan-
demic has slowed down the negotiations, but it still begs the question—after 
nearly twenty years of dithering over the Code, why is China now interested 
in quickly concluding the negotiations? Moreover, will ASEAN diplomats 
be so obsessed with concluding the illusive Code of Conduct that they will 
lose their objectivity and accept a bad agreement rather than no Code at all? 
Given that the PRC has complete control of the Paracels and de 
facto control of Scarborough Shoal and has completed its reclamation pro-
jects and militarization of its occupied features in the Spratlys, the answer 
should be obvious. At this point, the PRC has nothing to lose and everything 
to gain by concluding a Code of Conduct that solidifies its claims and ad-
vances its national security and economic interests in the SCS, all at the ex-
pense of ASEAN and a free and open Indo-Pacific region. As a precondition 
to further negotiations, ASEAN should insist that China demilitarize its SCS 
outposts and remediate the damage to the marine environment caused by its 
reclamation activities. 
All the SCS claimants have conducted limited land reclamation pro-
jects on their claimed features over the past fifty years. The Philippines re-
claimed fourteen acres of land to extend the runway on Thitu Island during 
the 1970s and 1980s.59 Malaysia similarly reclaimed land to build an airfield 
on Swallow Reef in the 1980s.60 Additionally, Vietnam reclaimed about sixty 
acres of land and built new structures on seven of its outposts between 2009 
and 2014, while Taiwan reclaimed about eight acres of land to improve the 
airstrip on Itu Aba Island.61 However, these modest improvements pale in 
comparison to the PRC reclamation and militarization activities in the Para-
cels and Spratlys. Between 2013 and 2015, China reclaimed over 3,200 acres 
of land on several of the features it occupies in the SCS.62 Militarization of 
these outposts with large airfields and deep-water ports draws into question 
 
58. Luchi de Guzman, ASEAN Targets Completion of Code of Conduct Within Three Years, 
CNN PHILIPPINES (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/11/4/ 
asean-china-code-of-conduct-south-china-sea.html. 
59. ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 10, at 15. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id.; DOD ANNUAL REPORT (2016), supra note 13, at 13; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN-
VOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2019); James N. Mattis, U.S. Secretary of 













China’s true intentions in the SCS. Under a binding Code of Conduct, future 
improvements to their SCS outposts to counter the PRC’s extensive milita-
rization of the region would be prohibited, a significant infringement on the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other claimants. 
The PRC’s proposal to prohibit the parties from engaging in oil and 
gas exploration and exploitation with companies from countries outside the 
region equally infringes on the other claimants’ sovereign rights in their 
EEZ. It would, in effect, give the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) a de facto monopoly over hydrocarbon development in the SCS. 
The PRC’s proposal that extra-regional companies be excluded from partic-
ipating in oil and gas joint ventures in the SCS creates uncertainty for inter-
national firms that may want to bid on oil and gas contracts and gives 
CNOOC the upper hand in any joint venture arrangements. 
It should also be noted that the South China Sea arbitral tribunal specif-
ically found that China had violated its obligations under UNCLOS, Article 
77, with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights over the non-living re-
sources of its continental shelf in the vicinity of Reed Bank.63 Nonetheless, 
the PRC and CNOOC continue to systematically interfere with Vietnam’s, 
Malaysia’s, and the Philippines’ sovereign rights in their respective EEZs in 
the vicinity of Vanguard Bank, Laconia Shoal/Breakers, and Reed Bank, re-
spectively.64  
The United States has expressed concern over China’s continuing inter-
ference with other SCS claimant’s oil and gas activities in their respective 
EEZs, calling into question Beijing’s commitment in the DOC to resolve its 
maritime disputes peacefully. Specifically, China has deployed government-
owned survey vessels with armed PLAN, CCG, and maritime militia escorts 
to intimidate other claimants from developing resources in their EEZs and 
coerce these nations to reject partnerships with foreign oil and gas compa-
nies and work exclusively with CNOOC. These malign actions not only un-
dermine regional peace and security but demonstrate China’s total disregard 
 
63. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 7, ¶¶ 651–716. 
64. Steve Mollman, The US Says China is Blocking $2.5 Trillion in South China Sea Oil and 
Gas, QUARTZ (Aug. 24, 2019), https://qz.com/1694322/south-china-seas-oil-and-natural-
gas-pretty-important-after-all/; Helen Clark, Oil and Gas Fueling South China Sea Tensions, 
ASIA TIMES (July 22, 2020), https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/oil-and-gas-fueling-south-
china-sea-tensions/; Philip Heijmans, High-Seas Energy Fight Off Malaysia Draws U.S., Chinese War-












for the rights of other nations under UNCLOS to conduct economic activi-
ties in their EEZs. Moreover, China’s interference has imposed enormous 
economic costs on its neighbors by blocking their access to over $2.5 trillion 
in unexploited oil and gas resources.65  
Finally, the PRC’s proposal prohibiting the parties from holding joint 
military exercises with countries from outside the region unless the parties 
concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection, will have a 
chilling effect on a free and open Indo-Pacific. It could also adversely impact 
the Department of Defense, given that the United States has defense treaties 
with the Philippines and Thailand, as well as a defined, albeit limited, defense 
relationship with Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act66 that requires mil-
itary-to-military engagement to maintain readiness and interoperability and 
enhance partner capacity and capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat a 
common enemy. 
The SCS is also home to some of the world’s busiest and most strategic 
sea lines of communication (SLOC). The importance of these SLOCs to 
Asian economic growth, as well as the global economy, cannot be overem-
phasized: 
 
• Eight of the world’s ten busiest container ports are in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
• Nearly one-third of the world’s maritime trade transits the SCS annually. 
• Over one-half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes 
through the SCS annually. 
• Approximately $5.3 trillion in ship-borne trade ($1.2 trillion bound for 
the United States) transits through the SCS annually. 
• About two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments transit through the Indian 
Ocean to the Pacific Ocean through the SCS annually (over fifteen mil-
lion barrels of oil pass through the Malacca Strait per day).67 
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Consequently, the United States has an enduring interest in preserving free 
and open maritime access to the SCS to protect our economic and security 
interests, as well as those of all Indo-Pacific nations. 
Since the end of World War II, the Indo-Pacific region has enjoyed un-
precedented economic growth, a prosperity that would not have been pos-
sible without a robust U.S. military presence to facilitate the unimpeded flow 
of trade and commerce through the SCS SLOCs. U.S. presence has therefore 
played a key role in buttressing regional peace, stability, and security, and it 
is in the interests of all nations that the United States maintain a robust pres-
ence to deter and prevent conflict in this vital region. The Chinese proposal, 
if adopted, would impede U.S. military access to the region, which would 
have a destabilizing effect on the regional and global economies. The United 
States is therefore committed to maintaining “the necessary military presence 
and capabilities to protect our interests and those of our allies and partners 
against potential threats in the maritime domain.”68 
Additionally, adoption of the PRC’s proposal would further Chinese ef-
forts to undermine the rule of law and liberal order of the world’s oceans. 
As a Pacific nation, Pacific leader, and Pacific maritime power, the United 
States has a national interest in countering the PRC’s efforts in this regard. 
One way to counterbalance this threat is to maintain a robust military pres-
ence in the region; strengthen partnerships with like-minded allies and part-
ners in the region; and encourage all States, including the PRC, to abide by 
the rule of law. 
In 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis made clear at the Shangri-La 
Dialogue that the Indo-Pacific region is America’s “priority theater,” and 
that, as a Pacific nation, the United States is “in the Indo-Pacific to stay.”69 
While intended to reassure regional allies and partners, as well as ASEAN, 
of America’s commitment to a “safe, secure, prosperous and free Indo-Pa-
cific”70 region, the secretary’s speech also sent a clear message to the PRC—
adhere to the international rules and norms that have brought relative peace 
and prosperity to the region for the past seventy years or face the conse-
quences.  
Moreover, the secretary openly chastised the PRC for its aggressive be-
havior in the SCS, calling into question Beijing’s stated intentions and 
broader policy goals for the region. Specifically, he criticized China’s milita-
rization of its artificial features in the SCS, stating that, despite China’s claims 
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to the contrary, the deployment of anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles, elec-
tronic jammers, and bomber aircraft was “tied directly to military use for the 
purposes of intimidation and coercion.”71 Moreover, these actions were in 
direct contradiction to President Xi’s public assurances to President Trump 
that China would not militarize its SCS features. 
The U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes that Chinese “efforts to 
build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow 
of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional 
stability.”72 China’s rapid military modernization also threatens U.S. access 
to the region and enhances Beijing’s political and security agenda. Accord-
ingly, the United States seeks to expand and strengthen Indo-Pacific alliances 
and partnerships in order to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific region 
that provides prosperity and security for all nations. This new security archi-
tecture will be “capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and 
ensuring free access to common domains” to “preserve the free and open 
international system” that has brought peace and prosperity to all nations in 
the region since 1945.73  
The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report builds on the 2017 National Se-
curity Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy. It re-emphasizes that the 
Indo-Pacific region is the priority theater for the Department of Defense 
and implements a strategy to increase forward presence, improve capabili-
ties, enhance posture in the region, and leverage and strengthen allies and 
partners to deter Chinese aggression, maintain regional peace and stability, 
and preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific.74 
In short, regional friends and allies are looking to the United States to 
exercise leadership to maintain a regional order that respects all nations’ sov-
ereignty, independence, and economic well-being. A weak, non-binding 
Code of Conduct that allows the PRC to continue to intimidate and harass 
its neighbors will not preserve peace and stability in the region. A weak Code 
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of Conduct will additionally enhance and legitimize China’s position and 
dominance over the SCS and ASEAN and allow China to continue to un-
ravel the rules-based order that has been the foundation of the region’s 
growth for the past five decades. Accordingly, unless these issues are satis-
factorily resolved, the United States should actively oppose, and encourage 
other nations to oppose, the negotiation and conclusion of a Code of Con-
duct for the SCS. 
